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Beyond the irony of intergroup contact: The effects of contact and threat on political 




     Research suggests that intergroup contact can ironically lead to a reduction in 
commitment to social change and that threat can play an important role in this 
process. In post- agreement societies, however, characterised more so by symbolic 
rather than material conflict, the role that intergroup contact and threat play in social 
action may be particularly complex. This paper examines intergroup contact, 
intergroup threat, support for political violence, and political participation, among a 
student sample (n=152) of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. Results 
show that contact is associated with lower symbolic and realistic threat for both 
groups, and to lower levels of support for political violence but not to political 
participation. Symbolic threat mediated the association between contact and support 
for political violence and between contact and political participation for the Protestant 
majority group only. This suggests that contact may have a positive effect upon group 
relations but that this is dependent upon status and the social-political context.  
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Beyond the irony of intergroup contact: The effects of contact and threat on political 
participation and support for political violence in Northern Ireland 
 
     Research on intergroup contact has demonstrated an ‘ironic effect’ of contact for 
minority groups, such that it can reduce prejudice but at the same time reduce 
collective action tendencies (Dixon, Levine, Reicher & Durrheim, 2012; Saguy, 
Tausch, Dovidio & Pratto, 2009). Further, whilst positive contact is associated with 
increased support for social change policies amongst majority group members (Dixon 
et al., 2012), this may not translate into practice (Saguy, Tropp & Hawi, 2013). This 
ironic effect of contact is clearly problematic in situations of pronounced structural 
inequalities which perpetuate division and conflict. And further, is often associated 
with threat perceptions. However, the ironic effects of contact through threat are less 
clear in situations where inequalities have been significantly reduced and 
peacebuilding becomes the primary goal. The research presented here aimed to 
examine the intricacies of the relationship between contact, threat and different forms 
of collective action, namely participation in political activities and support for 
political violence in the post-conflict setting of Northern Ireland. It is argued here that 
whilst contact can reduce tendencies towards collective action, the effects may depend 
on threat perceptions, the type of action being measured, group status and the specific 
context of intergroup interactions.  
Intergroup Contact, Group Status and Collective Action 
      Described as one of the most successful theories in social psychology (Dovidio, 
Gaertner & Kawakami, 2003), in its simplest form, the contact hypothesis states that 
bringing groups together under favourable conditions can help to reduce intergroup 
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prejudice and in turn foster positive community relations (Allport, 1954). The contact 
hypothesis has been supported in a large range of studies which have illustrated a 
modest but reliable relationship between contact and prejudice reduction (Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006). 
     However, these effects vary by group status. Tropp and Pettigrew (2005) reported 
that contact works better to reduce prejudice among majority members. Additionally, 
whilst contact can reduce majority group members’ negative and aggressive action 
tendencies towards minority groups (Schmid, Hewstone, Kupper, Zick & Tausch, 
2014), evidence is emerging that improving group attitudes through contact can have 
negative consequences for minority group members as it weakens their commitment 
to social change and thereby perpetuates their disadvantage (Dixon et al., 2012; Saguy 
et al., 2009).  
       This relationship is further complicated by the range of collective actions on 
which contact can exert an effect. As Wright (2009) points out, it is vital to 
distinguish the psychological mechanisms underpinning the link between contact and 
different forms of collective action, for example, what leads to attending a protest, 
compared to throwing a petrol bomb, as these will have very different consequences 
for intergroup relations. Evidence for this comes from Becker, Tausch, Spears and 
Christ (2011), who found that participation in radical action was associated with dis-
identification from the ingroup; however, this was not the case for moderate action. 
The present study, therefore, focuses on (1) political participation, and (2) support for 
political violence as different forms of collective action. 
       This differentiation facilitates an understanding of the conditions under which 
individuals are more likely to engage in different varieties of collective action. For 
example, Schmid et al. (2014) examined aggressive action tendencies of majority 
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group members towards immigrants across a number of European countries and found 
that contact was associated with a reduction in realistic threat and thereby a reduction 
in aggressive action tendencies. In a second study, which focused on relations 
between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, they found support for the 
longitudinal effects of contact in predicting a reduction in aggressive collective action 
at Time 2, again mediated through a reduction in realistic threat. In other words, the 
role of contact in reducing the level of perceived intergroup threat is central in 
predicting the form and level of subsequent aggressive action. This study, however, 
focused more closely on aggressive action rather than different forms of collective 
action tendencies.  
     Whilst there is some evidence that the consequences of different forms of 
collective action differently affect intergroup relations (Becker et al., 2011), there is 
little evidence on how this may be associated with group status in a real life conflict 
setting which has transitioned towards peace. This is an important limitation because 
minority and majority groups are likely to perceive and respond to threat differently. 
For example, previous research has suggested that high status groups are more likely 
to respond to threat with more force than low status groups (Stephan & Mealy, 2011). 
Moreover, both groups’ responses are likely to be shaped by the prior history and the 
current political context of intergroup interactions.  
     Bringing these findings together, it is argued that a consideration of the social 
context and of group status seems vital in any understanding of the relationship 
between intergroup contact, threat and different forms of collective action. This is 
particularly important in post-conflict settings where some level of political violence 
may persist but political engagement is still vital to maintain a viable social order.  
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The present study aims to examine these intricate processes in a real life conflict 
setting where group differences are complex and dynamic: Northern Ireland. 
 
The Present Study 
 
      Northern Ireland is an ethno-politically divided society in which historically the 
Protestant/British/Unionists were numerically, politically and economically superior 
to the Catholic/Irish/Nationalists (Cairns & Darby, 1998). In recent decades, the 
conflict is characterised by symbolic rather than material conflict, with group 
differences at the core. Group differences in this context are not physiognomic, yet 
individuals can categorise identity through explicit as well as subtle symbolic 
indicators. For example, flags, symbols, paintings, words, and clothing signify group 
membership identity and are associated with protests and political participation, as 
well as a means to mark territory. 
     The population of Northern Ireland currently stands at 1.811 million, of which 
45% of the resident population are Catholic and 48% are Protestant. This is a marked 
difference from the 1991 census, which was taken before the Good Friday/Belfast 
Peace Agreement, in which 42% self-identified as Protestant and 58% identified as 
Catholic. Whilst the Northern Ireland demographic is changing, historically Catholics 
are viewed as the economically and numerically disadvantaged group compared to 
Protestants and still remain disadvantaged in today’s Northern Ireland. For example, 
the 2014 Peace Monitoring Report shows that “Catholics still experience more 
economic and social disadvantage than Protestants” (Nolan, 2014, p.13) and that they 
are more likely to be unemployed and in poor health, compared to Protestants.  
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     Indeed, the recent conflict in Northern Ireland, known as the “Troubles‟, emerged 
from disputes in the late 1960’s over economic and political inequalities but escalated 
into a violent conflict over the constitutional state of Northern Ireland (Cairns & Darby, 
1998). In 1998, the Good Friday/ Belfast Agreement was signed which locked both groups 
into a ‘consociational’ power-sharing arrangement and institutionalized policies of 
intergroup equality and good relations. However, group relations remain fraught in 
Northern Ireland; a low level of political violence persists and the political agreement 
is unstable. As a result, the role of contact in promoting better intergroup relations, 
while maintaining the political engagement of both groups, has arguably never been 
more important.  
     A substantial body of research has demonstrated a positive effect of contact on 
intergroup attitudes in this context (c.f. Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell, & Hewstone, 
2006; Hewstone et al. 2004; McKeown, Cairns, Stringer & Rae, 2012; Paolini, 
Hewstone, Cairns, & Voci, 2004) but as yet little attention has been paid to its 
potentially ironic impact on different types of collective action through symbolic and 
realistic threat.   
Aim and Hypotheses 
     The aim of the present study is to understand the effects of intergroup contact on 
political participation and support for political violence, through intergroup threat 
(symbolic and realistic) and how this relationship may differ depending on group 
status. It addresses an important gap in the literature by measuring different forms of 
action (Wright et al., 2009): mild (political participation) and aggressive (support for 
political violence) in a real life context; in this case, relations between Protestants and 
Catholics in Northern Ireland.  
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      Importantly, this research draws upon previous studies which have demonstrated 
that intergroup contact can reduce aggressive collection action tendencies for both 
majority and minority group members through reductions in threat (Schmid et al., 
2014). The consideration of threat is particularly important in Northern Ireland due to 
the symbolic and material nature conflict. Whilst Schmid et al. found that only 
realistic threat can reduce aggressive action tendencies, the present study considered 
both realistic and symbolic threat due to the nature of the Northern Irish conflict in 
which both threats remain important. Based on this theoretical and empirical literature 
and the complexity of intergroup relations in the context of Northern Ireland, within 
the context of the overall conceptual model, it was hypothesised that:  
1. Intergroup contact will be associated with lower levels of political 
participation, particularly for the Catholic minority group; 
2. Intergroup contact will be associated with lower levels of support for political 
violence, particularly for the Catholic minority group; 
3. Intergroup contact will be associated with lower levels of political 
participation through lower levels of symbolic and realistic threat and that 
these effects will be moderated by group status; and,  
4. Intergroup contact will be associated with lower levels of support for political 
violence through lower levels of symbolic and realistic threat and that these 
effects will be moderated by group status.  
The overall conceptual model for Hypotheses 1 and 3 is presented in Figure 1 and for 
Hypotheses 2 and 4 are presented in Figure 2.  
 





     Sample 
     Student participants (n = 152) were recruited from a university in Northern 
Ireland. Participants were approached in social areas of the university and 
volunteered to complete a paper based survey; no compensation was given 
for their participation. The sample included 22 males and 130 females with a 
mean age of 22.31. Of these, 85 self-identified as Catholic and 67 as Protestant.  
     Measures 
     Demographics. Participants were asked for demographic information such as 
gender, age, country of birth and religious affiliation as well as the following: 
     Political participation. Participants rated on a 5-point scale (never to very often), 
how often they “participated in political activities” and how often they “display 
symbols associated with your community”. These two items were collapsed to 
measure political participation (Cronbach α = .66).  
    Support for political violence. Participants rated on a 5-point scale (strongly 
disagree to strongly agree), to what extent they agreed with three statements 
including: “In general I understand my group’s reasons for the use of violence 
throughout the conflict”, “In general, I have sympathy for my groups reasons for 
resorting to violent means throughout the conflict”, and a final reversed coded item 
“In general, I do not support my groups decisions to use violence throughout the 
conflict” (α = .73). 
     Threat: Building upon previous research both symbolic threat (associated with 
cultural/identity threat) and realistic threat (associated with resources) were 
measured in this study. Participants were asked to rate to what extent they agreed or 
disagreed with each statement on a 5-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly 
9 
 
agree). Adapted from Stephan et al. (2002) symbolic threat was measured by four 
items e.g. “Our way of life would be better if there were fewer members of the other 
community living here” (α = .73), and realistic threat was measured with four items 
e.g. “The other community has more economic power in Northern Ireland than they 
should” (α = .75).  
      Intergroup contact. Adapted from Voci and Hewstone, (2003), quality of contact 
was measured by asking participants to rate on a 7-point Likert scale to what extent 
they find contact with the other community “pleasant or unpleasant” and “rather 
positive or negative” (α = .90). Quantity of contact, also adapted from Voci and 
Hewstone (2003), was measured by asking participants to rate on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from “none at all” to “a great deal”, how much contact they have with 
people from the other community “at meetings and events”, “just chatting to people” 
and “over all social situations” (α = .83). Following Voci and Hewstone (2003), a 
single measure of contact was calculated by multiplying together quality and quantity 




Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
      A confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using AMOS was conducted to examine a 
two-factor solution for symbolic and realistic threat. The CFA revealed that a two factor 
model had good fit for the data (χ2 = 22.670, df = 19, p = .252, CFI .96, RMSEA = .05) 
whilst the one factor solution had poor fit to the data (χ2 = 48.575, df = 20, p < .001, 
CFI .92, RMSEA = .097). The chi-square difference test confirmed that two-factor 
solution was a better fit to the data (Δ δ, df(1) = 25.91, p < .05) and thus, a two factor 
solution was retained.  
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Moderated Mediation Analyses 
 
     To examine the relations among contact, threat, support for political violence and 
political participation, the direct and indirect effects were examined using the 
PROCESS model for SPSS. Two separate moderated mediation models (Model 59, 
Hayes, 2013) were tested with contact as the predictor variable (X), symbolic and 
realistic threat as the mediator variables (M), and support for political violence and 
political participation as outcome variables (Y), respectively. Group status (majority 
or minority) was the moderator (W) in both models.  Indirect effects were tested using 
bootstrapped confidence intervals with 50,000 samples. A significant indirect effect is 
observed when the confidence intervals exclude zero. Results are presented for each 
hypothesis with direct and indirect effects presented in Tables. See Table 1 for 
correlations and descriptive statistics.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
      Hypothesis 1: Contact and political participation  
    It was hypothesised that, within the overall model, intergroup contact would be 
associated with lower levels of political participation, particularly for the Catholic 
minority. Results indicate that in contrast to the hypothesis, there was no significant 
direct relation between contact and political participation, between group status and 
political participation, and no contact*group status interaction effect (Table 2c). 
INSERT TABLES 2abc ABOUT HERE 
     Hypothesis 2: Contact and support for political violence 
       Within the overall model, it was hypothesised that intergroup contact would be 
associated with lower levels of support for political violence, particularly for the 
Catholic minority. In partial support of this hypothesis, contact was found to be 
related to lower levels of support for political violence. There was no direct effect of 
11 
 
group status on political violence. Adopting a significance threshold of p < .05, there 
was no contact*group status interaction effect (Table 3c). However, it is worth noting 
that this effect was p = . 05, which may be interpreted as significant at the trend level, 
and suggests that the link from contact to support for political violence is weaker for 
Protestants than for Catholics (See Figure 3). Amongst those who report less contact, 
Protestants score higher on support for political violence relative to Catholics.  
INSERT TABLES 3abc ABOUT HERE  
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
     Hypothesis 3: Contact-threat-political participation  
      It was hypothesised that group status would moderate the mediation effects from 
intergroup contact on political participation through lower levels of symbolic and 
realistic threat. Overall, the moderated mediation model explained 13% of the 
variance in political participation (R2 = .13, F(7, 144) = 3.18, p = .004; Tables 2a, 2b, 
and 2c). The paths from intergroup contact to symbolic threat and to realistic threat 
were negative; this indicates that contact is related to lower levels of both forms of 
threat. By contrast, the path from symbolic threat to political participation was 
positive; this suggests that symbolic threat is associated with higher political 
participation. There was no significant link, however, from realistic threat to political 
participation, which suggests that realistic threat is not related to political 
participation.  
     Tests for interaction effects demonstrate that there was only one significant 
interaction effect: group status moderated the path from symbolic threat to political 
participation. The negative sign of this interaction effect implies that the relation 
between symbolic threat and political participation is weaker for the majority 
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Protestant sample compared to the minority Catholic sample. Group status did not 
significantly affect the strength of the relations between any of the other paths.  
     Tests for moderated mediation were conducted (Table 4). In contrast to the 
hypothesis, there was evidence for overall moderated mediation through symbolic 
threat (. 0251, se = .0097, 95% CI [. 0078, .0463] ) but not realistic threat (. 0057, se = 
.0069, 95% CI [-. 0065, .0209] ). This provides evidence that the indirect effect of 
contact on political participation, through symbolic threat, is dependent on group 
status. More specifically, this indirect effect was significant for the Protestant 
majority group (-. 0263, se = .0086, 95% CI [-. 0462,- .0118] ), but not for the 
Catholic minority group (-. 0012, se = .0045, 95% CI [-. 0133, .0056] ). 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE  
     Hypothesis 4: Contact-threat-support for political violence   
     It was hypothesised that group status would moderate the mediation effects from 
intergroup contact on support for political violence through lower levels of symbolic 
and realistic threat. Overall, the moderated mediation model explained 17% of the 
variance in political participation (R2 = .17, F(7, 144) = 4.247, p < .001; Tables 3a, 
3b, and 3c). There was no significant link from symbolic threat to support for political 
violence or from realistic threat to support for political violence.  
     There were no significant interactions of group status on any of the paths tested. In 
addition, tests of moderated mediation found that neither the overall indirect effect of 
symbolic threat (. 0144, se = .0116, 95% CI [-. 0064, .0389] ) nor realistic threat ( . 
0057, se = .0069, 95% CI [-. 0065, .0209]; Table 5) from contact to support for 
political violence were dependent on group status. However, examining the specific 
indirect paths for moderated mediation by group found an indirect effect between 
contact and support for violence through symbolic threat for the Protestant majority 
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group (-. 0223, se = .0096, 95% CI [-. 0461,- .0073] ), but not for the Catholic 
minority (-. 0079, se = .0064, 95% CI [-. 0235, .0023] ). Thus, symbolic threat 
mediated the impact of contact on support for violence among Protestants, but not 
Catholics.  




     Evidence suggests that contact can reduce collective action tendencies amongst 
majority and minority groups and that threat can influence this relationship. This 
paper set out to investigate the effects of contact and threat upon different forms of 
collective action for majority and minority group members in a post-conflict society, 
Northern Ireland. It was hypothesised that contact would be associated with lower 
levels of political participation and lower levels of support for violence, particularly 
for the Catholic minority group. It was further hypothesised that the relationship 
between contact and both forms of collective action would be mediated by threat. In 
support of previous research, contact was found to be associated with lower levels of 
symbolic and realistic threat. When all variables were included in the model (Tables 
2c and 3c), contact was also found to be associated with lower levels of support for 
political violence but not with political participation. Moderated mediation analysis 
demonstrated that contact was related to lower levels of symbolic threat perception 
and subsequently lower levels of both support for political violence and political 
participation, but only for the Protestant majority group. For the Catholic minority 
group, there were no indirect effects of contact on political participation or support for 
political violence through either forms of threat.  
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     Taken together these are important because they demonstrate, at least in the case of 
Northern Ireland, that (1) contact is associated with lower levels of the most 
detrimental form of collective action, i.e. support for political violence, and (2) that 
contact does not reduce the more constructive form of political activities essential in 
sustaining a political arrangement and promoting social equality. The indirect effect 
of symbolic threat in reducing both forms of participation for the Protestant majority 
group is also promising for promoting social equality in Northern Ireland. This is 
because higher levels of political participation amongst Protestants may in fact serve 
to maintain the social hierarchy and thereby social inequality. Therefore, these results 
are in line with previous research (e.g. Dixon et al., 2012; Saguy et al., 2013) which 
demonstrates that contact is associated with increased support for social equality 
amongst majority group members and reduced tendency towards violent actions 
(Schmid et al., 2014). The trend-level group status*contact interaction effect suggests 
that Protestants who report less frequent and lower quality contact show more support 
for political violence relative to Catholics. Further, amongst those who report more 
and better quality contact, Protestants are less likely to support political violence than 
Catholics. Given that this interaction effect is bordering the significance threshold, it 
should be interpreted with caution and replicated in future research. Nevertheless, it 
does offer some indication that, at least amongst this sample and for this particular 
outcome, contact works in different ways for the majority and minority group relative 
to one another.  
      These findings may be due to a number of characteristics present in (but not 
unique to) Northern Ireland as a post-conflict society. In Northern Ireland, equality is 
institutionalised in the power-sharing arrangements. Insofar as there is a perceived 
difference in status between the groups, political participation can be perceived as 
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geared towards improving the status of a historically disadvantaged minority. For this 
group then, participation has an automatic pay-off, independent of relations with the 
other side and therefore could be argued to be associated with promoting social 
equality. However, within the zero-sum game of Northern Ireland politics, Unionist 
politicians often report feeling sense of constant loss and threat to their previously 
dominant status. Thus, political participation and the assertion of political voice are 
typical responses to perceived threat, and for Protestants, may be associated with 
maintaining the current social hierarchy. Indeed, over the past number of years the 
disengagement of more moderate Unionists has been noted along with an increased 
association of local political engagement with violence (where local Loyalist activists 
publically protest a political arrangement that they feel does not express or represent 
their interests). In other words, while both sides may feel more or less threat, this will 
lead to very different outcomes according to how they articulate with the political 
system. Consequently, contact through threat may reduce support for violence and 
political disengagement only for the group for whom threat fuels protest. The 
observed indirect effect of contact on support for violence/ political participation 
through symbolic threat offers further support for the importance of symbolic threats 
over realistic threats in Northern Ireland, at least for the majority group. This may be 
a function of the current status quo in Northern Ireland where resource threat has been 
substantially reduced and relations between groups are now heavily characterised by 
symbolic differences.  It may also be related to the majority groups perceived position 
in society.  
     Whilst these findings are based on a very particular context, they could be relevant 
to other contexts in which group relations are based on symbolic divisions and where 
relative peace exists. For example, previous research in South Africa has shown that 
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the contact-collective action relationship can be different depending on the 
hierarchical nature of intergroup relations in a given society, such that for inter-
minority relations contact can promote collective action tendencies (Dixon et al., 
2015). As such, understanding the nature of collective action for whom and in which 
context is an important direction for future research.  
Limitations and Directions for Future research 
       Whilst this research aimed to embed an understanding of the ironic effects of 
contact through threat within a particular social and historical context, there are some 
limitations to this approach that should be considered in future research. First, the 
sample was drawn from a population of well-educated university students who 
arguably do not represent the wide range of views and perceptions of the Northern 
Irish context. Therefore, the results may not generalise to Northern Irish society more 
broadly. This may be why, for example, the mean scores for political participation are 
quite low amongst both groups. Second, the data are correlational and cross-sectional; 
therefore, causation cannot be determined and there are methodological limitations for 
determining the direction of effects in cross-sectional mediation (Maxwell & Cole, 
2007). Third, the measure of political participation relies on two single items which 
may not fully capture the nature of political participation in Northern Irish society. 
This measure, therefore, could be adapted to include different levels of political 
participation and perhaps differentiate between aggressive (e.g., protesting or use of 
violence during protests) and benign (e.g., signing a petition) forms of political 
participation. Fourth, the focus here has been on positive contact; therefore, the 
effects of negative contact cannot be determined. Future research should aim to 
consider both forms of contact as emerging evidence demonstrates that negative 
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contact can also be a predictor of collective action tendencies (Reimer et al., in press). 
Fifth, the research presented here focuses on a very specific context of majority and 
minority relations and therefore, future research is needed to examine whether these 
findings hold for other post-agreement societies. Despite these limitations, this 
research adds an important contribution to the debate on the ironic effects of contact 
by illustrating the complex and asymmetrical effects of contact as a peace-building 
tool in a society working through the complexities of associations with threat in a 
society experiencing a post-accord phase. And, whilst the research has taken place in 
a specific conflict setting, studying collective actions in context is vital for teasing 
apart violent and non-violent behaviours and associated consequences and for 
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